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ABSTRACT 
In the 1980s and 1990s, the impending return of Hong Kong to China by 1997 had 
triggered a major confidence crisis in Hong Kong. A new logic of governance would 
have to be created to substitute the then colonial logic which emphasized 
administrative efficiency and the rule of convenience, a logic that the local population 
had implicitly accepted out of political acquiescence. However, the path towards a 
new Hong Kong as a special administrative region (SAR) had not been accompanied 
by the proper decolonization and democratization of the governance system. Old wine 
was put into new bottle. The political order as enshrined in Hong Kong’s Basic Law 
had largely been a continuation (and at most a re-institutionalization) of the ancient 
regime. Since 1997, the Hong Kong SAR has been suffering from one legitimacy crisis 
after another. The infallibility of the administrative state, long held responsible for 
Hong Kong’s success story in the final decades of British colonial rule, has by now 
been largely eroded. In 2002, government by bureaucrats was replaced by 
government by politically-appointed ministers, in the hope of enhancing executive 
accountability and improving policy performance and governance effectiveness. Yet, 
that failed to deliver results. This article traces the development of the post-colonial 
administrative state in Hong Kong from 1997 to the present. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In the 1980s and 1990s, the impending return of Hong Kong to China by 1997 had 
triggered a major confidence crisis in Hong Kong. A new logic of governance would 
have to be created to substitute the then colonial logic which emphasized 
administrative efficiency and the rule of convenience, a logic that the local population 
had implicitly accepted out of political acquiescence. However, the path towards a 
new Hong Kong as a special administrative region (SAR) had not been accompanied 
by the proper decolonization and democratization of the governance system. Old wine 
was put into new bottle. The political order as enshrined in Hong Kong’s Basic Law 
had largely been a continuation (and at most a re-institutionalization) of the ancient 
regime. 
 
Since 1997, the Hong Kong SAR has been suffering from one legitimacy crisis after 
another. The infallibility of the administrative state, long held responsible for Hong 
Kong’s success story in the final decades of British colonial rule, has by now been 
largely eroded. In 2002, government by bureaucrats was replaced by government by 
politically-appointed ministers, in the hope of enhancing executive accountability and 
improving policy performance and governance effectiveness. Yet, that failed to 
deliver results. In March 2005, the businessman-turned-politician Tung Chee-hwa was 
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replaced by the former top civil servant Donald Tsang as Chief Executive of the SAR. 
Tsang has since partially returned to the age-old colonial wisdom of government by 
administrators, and sought to forge a compromise model of ‘government by political 
bureaucrats’. That again has not proved to end the political quagmire after all. Since 
mid-2008, the government’s popularity has been hit by repeated incidents – over the 
extension of political appointments (of Undersecretaries and Political Assistants)2, 
and controversies over the foreign domestic helpers’ levy3, old age allowance4, 
Lehman Brothers ‘mini-bonds’5, the government’s slow response in sending charter 
planes to Thailand to fly back Hong Kong people stranded there because of the 
closure of Bangkok airports due to political crisis6, and the latest controversy over the 
trial scheme on school drug testing7. 
 
The failure of governance can be diagnosed with respect to systemic defects, decline 
of state capacity, and the crisis of social cohesion and shared vision8. Most academic 
literature pointed to a decline in the government’s capacity to lead and govern. Scott, 
for example, summed up the SAR’s crisis as “the disarticulation of Hong Kong’s 
post-handover political system”, with the following defects: 
 
“[T]he relationships between the executive, the legislature and the bureaucracy today are 
uncoordinated, poorly developed, fractious and sometimes dysfunctional…. [W]ith a 
system which is neither parliamentary fish nor presidential fowl, the executive, the 
bureaucracy and the legislature (which is divided within itself) each pursue their own 
agendas, punctuated by occasional skirmishes on the boundaries of their domains and by 
subterranean campaigns to extend their jurisdictions”9. 
 
More fundamentally, it has to do with the post-1997 problems of institutional 
incompatibility resulting from a political regime originating in colonial times having 
to cope with post-colonial needs and demands10. Not only have the executive and 
bureaucracy been suffering a crisis of credibility, the legislature and political parties 
have also been in decline.11 Despite the introduction of a new ministerial system of 
political appointments by former Chief Executive Tung Chee-hwa in July 2002 to 
strengthen the government team and to improve accountability and responsiveness, 
the government had remained caught in a quagmire characterized by policy impasse 
and the lack of capacity to deliver results. The anti-government protests of July 2003 
by over half a million population marked the worst crisis of governance, widening 
social disharmony, government-people tensions, and essentially an institutional 
breakdown. 
 
China’s policy on Hong Kong’s reversion was to seek to minimize the extent of 
political change in favour of continuity and stability. Thus the Basic Law of the SAR 
has left the colonial configuration of government largely intact. The Chief Executive 
is not democratically elected. Only up half of the legislature is elected by universal 
suffrage. Such constitutional design intends to keep governmental power within the 
original ruling elites dominated by the bureaucratic class. However, during the 
political transition leading to the transfer of sovereignty in 1997, the local political 
landscape had already undergone continuous transformation with the introduction of 
legislative elections and the emergence of political parties and elected politicians. The 
post-1997 political system was not and could not be just a replication of the previous 
colonial system of governance. 
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By now Hong Kong’s political trajectory has come to a stage where a political culture 
of distrust is building up and being reinforced at a time when political trust is much in 
need for different institutions to cooperate, and for enabling the government to govern 
effectively and lead society in major policy innovations and reforms. This article 
reviews Hong Kong’s post-1997 governance within the context of Hong Kong’s 
political trajectory to become part of China, and diagnoses the nature of the current 
political quagmire - highlighting major constraints and dilemmas as well as 
institutional setbacks and failures due to the inability to re-establish a new logic of 
governance and political ethos as the pre-existing political order continues to be 
eroded, whether by design or by circumstances. 
 
POST-HANDOVER CRISIS IN GOVERNANCE: DIAGNOSIS OF 
DIFFICULTIES OF THE TUNG ADMINISTRATION 
Institutional incompatibilities 
On the surface there was supposed to be ‘no change’ in Hong Kong’s policymaking 
architecture after the handover. In practice, however, the actors occupying that 
inherited architecture, their interests and thinking, and both the internal and external 
habitats, had all undergone subtle but significant changes. The post-1997 policy and 
political scene has become increasingly crowded, producing a highly ‘differentiated’ 
polity for government12. The kind of cohesive administration as practised during 
autocratic colonial times was no longer viable.  
 
The former Hong Kong colony was an ‘administrative state’13, with government by 
the bureaucrats under the rule of the British governor, supported by business and 
professional elites14. All top government posts were almost exclusively filled by 
members of the elite ‘Administrative Class’ (the Administrative Officers, or AOs) 
acting in effect as ‘ministers’. Both the Executive Council (Exco) and Legislative 
Council (Legco) were appointed, which served to support and advise government 
rather than to challenge, and check and balance it. At the same time, through 
‘administrative absorption’ whereby business and professional elites were appointed 
to an extensive web of advisory and statutory bodies, the colonial government was 
able to forge some form of elite integration and support in society15. The net result 
was a fused model of executive-legislative collaboration underpinned by a reasonably 
high degree of political consensus and trust among the ruling elites. In other words 
there was joined-up governance of an undemocratic kind. 
 
Such a mode of administrative state became not sustainable after the handover. The 
experience under the rule of the first Chief Executive Tung Chee-hwa (July 1997 - 
March 2005) had clearly exposed serious stress and uncertainties in institutional 
relationships. Being separately constituted through elections instead of appointed by 
the government, the legislature had become a major countervailing force to the 
executive, which could not guarantee legislative support, not to mention a majority. 
Whereas party politics had become the order of the day in Legco, government still 
tried to hang on to the colonial style of party-less administration, thus unavoidably 
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encountering growing difficulties. Executive-legislative tensions and rivalries were 
but expected.  
 
In the SAR era, intra-elite rivalries had first emerged between two ‘executive-led’ 
paradigms16, with the senior civil service adhering to the traditional executive-led 
principle of civil service-run government while Tung and his allies pushing for an 
Exco-led government. Because of public dismay with the performance of the AOs-run 
government in dealing with the Asian financial turmoil and other post-handover crises 
such as bird flu and the public housing short-piling scandal, Tung took the 
opportunity to introduce a new ministerial system of political appointment of principal 
officials to head policy bureaus in June 2002; until then ministerial portfolios had 
continued to be assumed by administrative mandarins as in the colonial past. However 
such an attempt to change tack in face of new political challenges miscarried as many 
people doubted the legitimacy of the new ministerial system in a context suspected to 
be structurally biased towards Beijing and the powerful business lobby. In the event 
the new ministerial system had actually intensified the rivalry for policy power. 
Several politically-appointed secretaries were subsequently forced to resign in the 
aftermath of the historic mass protests of July 1, 200317.  
 
Under British rule, the population could acquiesce to colonial governance for want of 
a better alternative (and returning to Chinese communist rule was not considered such 
an alternative for many who had escaped to Hong Kong as either political or 
economic refugees from mainland China). An enlightened but efficient form of 
authoritarian government was thus politically tolerated. Such a colonial logic was no 
longer sustainable after 1997 when the general public expected the government to be 
accountable and responsive under the principle of self-administration. In the absence 
of universal suffrage in electing the Chief Executive and Legco, it was difficult to 
gain enough political trust from the public through the pre-existing institutions of 
governance. 
 
There is now no going back to the previous colonial mode of government by 
bureaucrats and government by consultation. The ministerial layer has already been 
separated from the civil service and there is some degree of representative democracy 
augmented by a new form of executive accountability under POAS. The old 
executive-led orthodoxy and the colonial mechanisms of administrative domination 
and absorption had become either eroded or proved insufficient to cope with new 
demands and challenges. The formal power configuration under the Basic Law has 
displayed increasing incompatibility with the actual interplay of powers and 
expectations among various political players and institutions. Instead of having a 
government with unchallenged executive power, as exemplified in the heydays of 
colonial rule, the SAR government is now constrained in both formulating and 
implementing policy. All of the major institutional actors feel inhibited from 
performing their roles, making the political system essentially ‘disabled’18. 
 
Changes in policy and political environment 
Policymaking by bureaucrats during colonial rule was by nature a combination of 
institutional inertia and professional rationality driven top-down. It was at the same 
time adaptive enough to external changes since the regime’s very existence was not 
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under threat. Because of the need to secure some degree of policy legitimacy in the 
absence of democracy, the colonial government had long practiced a system of 
government by consultation. Strengthened by fiscal surplus and internal 
modernization since the 1970s, it was able to chart a reformist course of governance 
that helped to gradually ease government-people tensions and shore up the regime’s 
legitimacy. From the 1980s onwards, the scope of incorporation of community views 
had been extended to the local district level, through the setting up of district boards. 
Established interest groups, trades and professional bodies, and the public at large 
were consulted as a matter of routine. 
 
All this has changed since the 1997 handover (Table 1). Partisan bargaining has 
become the order of the day, both between government and Legco and among parties 
within the legislature. The importance of advisory and statutory bodies has been 
overshadowed by the Legco policy panels since the 1990s, and then after 2002, by the 
rise of new politically-appointed ministers who are held ‘accountable’ for policy 
outcomes. The government has to increasingly go for political consultations and 
negotiations – with legislators, parties, and business and labour organizations – in 
order to secure enough support and legitimacy for its policies. The influence of the 
mass media, think tanks, as well as academic and public commentators has also been 
on the rise. The whole policy process has been drawn out of the traditional ‘safe’ 
closet of government-by-bureaucrats and government-by-consultation, into the open 
and more uncertain arena of partisan politics, interest negotiation, media spin, opinion 
polls, and political mobilizations. 
 
The colonial government did not adhere to any political ideology. It was 
administratively pragmatic, economically conservative and fiscally limited, as 
represented by the saying inside government: “if it’s not broken, why fix it?”.  Leo 
Goodstadt, head of the Central Policy Unit in the final decade of British rule, 
observed that laissez faire doctrines and ‘positive non-interventionism’ enabled the 
colonial bureaucrats to resist pressures of reverse capture by the privileged business 
and professional classes and to steer “more acceptable boundaries between public and 
private interests within a political system … based on a partnership between 
colonialism and capitalism”19. Being non-ideological, the bureaucratic elites had 
expanded welfare and public services, not out of pursuit of any clearly defined value 
preferences or ideological convictions, but for the sake of doing something good that 
government could afford as public finances improved and coping with changing 
public expectations and circumstances. The 1970s thus saw rapid administrative 
modernization, active urban and New Town planning, and the launch of ambitious 
social policy blueprints (for education, medical and health services, housing, labour 
and social welfare). By the early 1980s the previous laissez-faire principle had given 
way to the more proactive expression of ‘positive non-interventionism’ in the 
government’s policy thinking – which recognized the government’s responsibility to 
intervene when social obligations and public interests demanded it. 
 
Whereas the previous colonial system of policymaking was characterized by the 
absence of a political regime, so that the mandarins essentially ran the show according 
to administrative pragmatism, the new SAR government is subject to more values-
ladden community mobilizations and class politics unleashed by the rapid 
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politicization of the policy scene. The emergence of new non-institutional cleavages 
grounded in value-oriented interests had imposed greater demand on the limited 
political and policy capacity of the SAR government. Conflicts have widened over 
public policy directions. A more active and differentiated polity has imposed the need 
for more government interventions, especially amidst economic uncertainties in the 
aftermath of the 1997-98 Asian economic turmoil, and again now under the global 
financial tsunami.  
 
The impetus to more strategic interventions has come from two directions. First, the 
ascendancy of electoral politics, political negotiations, and popular demands has 
coerced government into discarding the traditional boundaries of non-intervention. 
Second, the need for economic restructuring following the economic crisis and the 
reality of globalized competition have together forced the government to increasingly 
adopt a steering role in economic development.  New cleavages have also come from: 
 the clash of values between government and the more vocal, assertive and value-
oriented professional middle-classes, as seen in environmental, heritage 
protection, democracy, and core values issues;  
 the concern about government-business relations, which the public, including 
even some professionals and small-and-medium enterprises, are watching with 
suspicion for fear of ‘government-business collusion’ in the transfer of 
advantages; and  
 the rise of ‘national interest’ as a variable in policymaking, as observed in the 
Article 23 saga in 2002-03 over national security legislation. 
 
The traditional form of government based on bureaucratic domination and 
administrative cooptation is no longer conducive to managing a complex society with 
conflicting interests and cleavages in values. The pre-1997 mode of policymaking 
cannot be sustained, not to mention that the old institutional architecture and its 
underlying logic have been subject to erosion by new expectations and political 
changes. There is the need to reform institutions and their modus operandi so as to 
improve the relationships between the political executive and bureaucracy, between 
the executive and legislature, between government and opposition, and within the 
wider scene, between government and society and government and business. A new 
institutional logic has to be found to help forge policy consensus and agreement 
amidst rising and diverse expectations and conflicts of interests and values. 
 
Table 1: Policymaking in Hong Kong, before and after 1997 
 
Features Colonial era SAR era 
Policy actors: 
from single to  
multi actor 
Bureaucrats-led; dominated 
by the elite Administrative 
Officers (AOs) 
From bureaucrats-led to political 
ministers-led; 
 
Rise of elected politicians, parties 
and civil society activism: 
 
Bureaucratic monopoly of 
policymaking powers has been 
broken 
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Policy habitat: from 
relatively orderly to 
a more unstable and 
crowding 
environment 
A relatively more submissive, 
acquiescent society, 
politically under-mobilized 
and less articulate; 
 
Environment began to change 
during post-1984 transition 
period 
Crowding because of increase in 
actors, higher mobilization, and 
greater demand for participation; 
 
A more complex society and a 
more differentiated polity; 
 
‘Strong executive, weak policy 
capacity’ – in terms of 
constitutional design, the centre 
may appear strong; in policy 
practice, the centre has become 
increasingly vulnerable to various 
political and administrative 
challenges 
 
Policy process: from 
policy consultation 
to political 
negotiation 
A system of government by 
consultation – known 
invariably as ‘government by 
discussion’, and ‘the 
administrative absorption of 
politics’;  
 
Policy consultation through 
advisory bodies as means to 
achieve policy legitimacy 
Government has to increasingly go 
for political consultations and 
negotiations – with legislators, 
parties, and principal business and 
labour organizations – in order to 
secure enough support and 
legitimacy for its policies;  
 
The influence of the mass media, 
academic and public commentators, 
and public opinion polls, is on the 
rise 
 
Policy philosophy:  
from positive non- 
interventionism to 
contentions over 
interventions and 
values 
“If it’s not broken, why fix 
it?” – Positive non- 
interventionism, coupled with 
administrative contingency; 
 
Being non-ideological, and 
grounded always in fiscal 
prudence, the bureaucratic 
elites had expanded welfare 
and public services not out of 
pursuit of any clearly-defined 
value preferences or 
ideological convictions, but 
largely to do something good 
that government could afford 
as public finances improved. 
The ascendancy of electoral 
politics, political negotiations, and 
popular demands has together 
coerced government into discarding 
the traditional boundaries of non-
intervention; 
 
New cleavages have emerged: 
 The clash of values; 
 The concern over government-
business relations; 
 The rise of ‘national interest’ as a 
variable in policymaking  
 
 
A decade after the handover, the tendency for preserving the status quo driven by the 
institutional force of path-dependency, coexisting with political and institutional 
resistance to change, has rendered the policy regime more stagnant than expected.  
The policymaking system has suffered from what may be denoted as ‘double 
regression’: 
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 An inherited system of government falling behind current (and still rising) public 
expectations and new political realities; and 
 A gap between conventional government-centred ethos inherited from the 
colonial era, and the new age of socially-embedded ‘governance’ where a new 
style in policymaking is called for in order to manage conflict and to govern a 
differentiated polity. 
 
Overall weakening of state capacity 
In addition to weakening institutional strength and policy capacity, the SAR 
government had also suffered from dwindling state capacity. The absence of popular 
mandate, as for the previous colonial regime, created pressure to perform through 
public services and social and economic interventions. In the aftermath of the Asian 
economic crisis, new uncertainties and anxieties, amidst a prolonged recession, had 
induced higher expectations on the government to deliver relief measure and results. 
Even recognizing the importance of using performance to trade for political 
acceptance and legitimacy, the government’s ability to respond to rising expectations 
and its capacity to incorporate various interests and deliver governance results were 
constrained by the crisis of public finance, and an unsettling bureaucracy. The more 
economic hardship the population was experiencing as compared to the pre-1997 
‘golden era’ of affluence, the less people were prepared to acquiesce the non-
democratic nature of SAR rule and to give it support for taking hard policy choices. 
Without public support or policy consensus, it was in turn difficult for the government 
to lead society and industry to go through the much-needed economic restructuring 
that was bound to create pain that everybody had to share. 
 
As the government’s performance declined, its legitimacy deficit was increasingly 
exposed, resulting in a vicious cycle. The concurrent deficits in state, policy and 
administrative capacities had together resulted in a government that was widely 
perceived as neither legitimate, nor competent, nor effective. Although Tung steered a 
pro-business political course, state-business relations were seen mostly in terms of 
various business and industrial interests seeking to capture the government for their 
own gains but not in facilitating state leadership and management over economic 
development. State-society relations had worsened since 1997 as the Tung 
government sought to depoliticize society and failed to forge an inclusive style of 
governance, thereby causing rising social alienation. The crisis of public finance and 
the need to perform had induced the government to embark on too many top-down 
policy reforms (in the civil service, education, housing, social welfare, and financial 
services markets) which, due to poor handling and insufficient consultation, had 
mostly backfired and agitated stakeholders across the social spectrum. With both 
institutional and policy shortfalls, and its popularity in the ebb, the government was 
rendered increasingly ineffective in making and delivering policies.   
 
The erosion of state capacity due to performance, legitimation and integration failures 
was largely responsible for the sorry state of policy immobilism. Table 2 below 
contrasts state capacity before and after 1997, pointing to deterioration in some 
aspects during the SAR period. 
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Table 2: Elements of state capacity in Hong Kong before and after 1997 
 
Conditions Before 1997 Post-1997 
Political 
environment 
• From de-politicization to 
limited accommodation of 
local politics 
• Government by discussion and 
co-optation 
• Legitimation by performance 
and acquiescence 
• Disintegration of political 
institutions 
• Concurrent crises of 
performance, legitimacy, 
integrity and confidence 
Within government • Administrative domination and 
modernization 
• Using the bureaucracy as the 
means to achieve performance 
– bureaucratic reformism 
• Decoupling of political 
and administrative elites 
• From government by 
bureaucrats to 
government by 
politically-appointed 
ministers, creating 
bureaucratic 
dissatisfaction 
• Staff morale problem due 
to civil service reform 
Economic 
environment and 
philosophy 
• From ‘laissez-faire’ to ‘positive 
non-interventionism’, to 
‘consensus capitalism’ 
• Prolonged period of economic 
boom providing necessary 
fiscal basis for policy 
performance 
• Asian crisis and ensuing 
economic recession 
exposing structural fiscal 
deficits 
• Government economic 
philosophy tossed 
between more or less 
intervention 
Government-society 
interface and 
public sentiments 
• From exclusionary corporatist 
system to partially inclusionary 
state 
• From ‘hands off’ approach to 
integrationist approach in 
community building 
• Growing disconnection 
between government and 
society as demand for 
public participation is not 
sufficiently 
accommodated 
• Social cohesion in 
jeopardy, as evidenced by 
escalating anti-
government protests 
Source: Adapted with modifications from Anthony B. L. Cheung, (2005) “State Policy Capacity in 
Hong Kong, Singapore and Taiwan: Coping with Legitimation, Integration and Performance”, in J. 
Pierre and M. Painter (eds) State Policy Capacity: Global Trends and Comparative Perspectives, 
London: Palgrave,  225-54, Table 2. 
 
The belief in the previous Hong Kong ‘growth miracle’ – which the ‘One Country 
Two Systems’ framework sought to preserve - had largely evaporated in the early 
post-1997 years as economic recession and then government mismanagement and 
failure crept in. Old social and policy assumptions no longer seemed to hold; instead, 
there was widespread disarray in public sentiments and growing fragmentation of an 
originally fragile society cemented largely by economic success in the past. Due to 
institutional constraints and the failure of the political leadership in understanding the 
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problems of the wider social and political processes, the capacity of government in 
solving problems of social cohesion was limited, rendering social fragmentation and 
disintegration all the more unmanageable. The crisis of social cohesion in Hong Kong 
was at the same time a crisis of governability. 
 
ATTEMPTS TO RESTORE STRONG GOVERNANCE IN THE POST-TUNG 
ERA: INITIATIVES OF THE TSANG ADMINISTRATION 
Beijing’s policy towards Hong Kong after the traumatic 1 July protests in 2003 had 
focused on re-imposing political order and restoring executive power, and to re-assert 
its leadership over Hong Kong. By picking as Tung’s successor in March 2005 an 
experienced administrator known for his uncompromising style in the person of 
Donald Tsang, Beijing hoped for a stronger ‘executive-led’ government given his 
high popularity and ability to work better with civil servants. This somewhat 
presented an opportunity for change. With an ‘insider’ in charge of government, it 
was generally believed that the AOs as old hands would make a comeback to power20. 
However, constraints in terms of institutional path-dependency and Beijing’s political 
straitjacket on Hong Kong were often underestimated.  
 
The range of options was rather limited. Returning to the pre-1997 system of 
bureaucratic governance was unrealistic for several reasons. As pointed out, the 
colonial model was primarily incompatible with the post-1997 popular expectations 
and the new political environment of emerging parties and elected politicians. The 
introduction of the new ministerial system had already bifurcated the government elite 
into political appointees and the senior bureaucrats. It reinforced the political 
neutrality principle of the civil service system to an extent that it was doubtful if 
senior civil servants would welcome taking up political responsibilities that would 
make them bear the brunt of legislative politics and popular pressure. Furthermore, 
Tung’s failure, ironically, had also fuelled greater demands for accountability and 
responsiveness. Government by consultation had to be replaced by government by 
consent. Ways and means needed to be urgently found to reincorporate and reconnect 
economic and social interests, and to renegotiate some form of institutionalized 
political order that could function even if constitutional reforms lagged behind 
because of Beijing’s reservation on speedier democratization.  
 
Reinventing a hybrid administrative state 
Tsang had promised to build a strong and efficient government, portraying his style of 
leadership as follows: 
 
“We have to have good leadership, one that sees clearly the needs of the community and 
is dedicated to the goal of enhancing the welfare of the community, bearing in mind the 
encouragement and insights of our community leaders”. 
 
“Amidst the quick changes, the Government must act cautiously and yet courageously, 
engage the community, collect insights, leverage opportunities in a timely manner, make 
decisions resolutely and implement decisively. Do the right thing and to do good for the 
majority of people”21. 
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He also pledged to foster a closer partnership between the executive and the 
legislature to facilitate consensus politics22. ‘Consensus politics’ was once attributed 
to the British colonial administration’s governing style since the 1970s, as a substitute 
for an undemocratic system lacking a popular mandate.  
 
Whereas Tung’s project in his second term (from July 2002) was to recruit outsiders 
into government, and to retain former civil servants as ministers in charge of some 
portfolios as a transitional arrangement, Tsang, due to his bureaucratic background, 
saw the civil service as the backbone of his administration and opted for a reverse 
approach – to retain some outsiders in his administration but to principally rely upon 
the civil service (mainly the AOs) as the source of ministerial talent from which to 
recruit future ministers23. He also decided to extend political appointment to the layers 
of junior ministers (known as Under-secretaries) and political assistants to provide a 
broader political support base to the cabinet24. This could be interpreted as reinventing 
a ‘hybrid administrative state’ based essentially on ‘government by political 
bureaucrats’, and accompanied by a loose network of cross-sector and possibly multi-
party linkages facilitated by political appointments to Exco and major statutory and 
advisory committees. The AOs had once again provided the unifying and sustaining 
force of government, to bring policy and administrative organizations together within 
more coherent structures and processes. Despite Tsang’s pro-bureaucracy orientation, 
however, the ministers-bureaucracy cleavage would prevail. Indeed some AOs have 
remained highly suspicious of the effectiveness of the political appointment system; 
such sentiments underscored the uproar against the appointment of under-secretaries 
and political assistants in May 200825.  
 
In state-economy relations, Tsang proclaimed in September 2006 that positive non-
interventionism was no longer a relevant factor in government policy, though he still 
maintained the importance of ‘big market, small government’. This triggered not a 
small row in society, inviting severe criticisms from both free-market ideologues and 
opposition politicians who worried a more interventionist government that lacked 
popular mandate. The hard reality was that political pressures and social demands, 
induced by external economic challenges, had together coerced the state to become 
more assertive in social and economic development. An economic summit of top 
business leaders and government officials held in late 2006, in response to China’s 
11th Five-Year Plan, resulted in a blueprint for Hong Kong’s development in the vital 
industrial sectors (financial services, logistics, tourism, information technology, and 
professional services)26. In 2009, amid the global financial tsunami, a Task Force on 
Economic Challenges, headed by Tsang himself, identified six industries with 
potential – namely Testing and Certification; Medical Services; Innovation and 
Technology; Cultural and Creative Industries; Environmental Industry; and 
Educational Services.27 By necessity or by choice, the SAR government has steadily 
embraced a more active and interventionist economic role. The question remains, 
though, as to how to accompany such a role shift with suitable institutional 
mechanisms and tools of intervention.  
 
Tsang’s attempt to bring back a politics of consensus, so as to shore up his 
governance capacity, was also cast in doubt. He seemed still working largely within 
the traditional bureaucratic paradigm that saw the cooptation of legislators and 
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community leaders as an adjunct to an ‘executive-led’ and civil service-dominated 
administration. In the absence of more novel institutional means to link up the 
executive and legislature, the overall system of governance would remain disjointed, 
even though he had worked hard to reinvigorate executive power and the government 
machinery.  
Tsang’s political quagmire 
So far, Tsang’s efforts to rebuild a strong administrative state without parties and 
popular mandate, and just relying on the bureaucracy and advisory committees, have 
largely been frustrated. The relations between government and civil society and 
various stakeholders have yet to be improved. Meanwhile, old-style consultative 
politics no longer works. As society becomes more differentiated and politicized, 
sometimes not just over conflicts in interests but also in values, and as new civil 
society activism emerges and escalates, the traditional form of absorption politics 
based on the co-optation of business and professional elites no longer suffices to carry 
the public view and confer policy legitimacy28. State-society connection is still weak 
and political trust low. Executive-legislative relations have remained stressful29. The 
absence of democratic election has deprived him of the opportunity to get a clear 
political mandate to govern.30 He does not enjoy firm support from any political party; 
even so-called government-friendly parties such as the pro-Beijing Democratic 
Alliance for the Betterment and Progress of Hong Kong (DAB) and the pro-business 
Liberal Party have sought to distance themselves from government on some policy 
issues for the sake of scoring political points. The pro-democracy opposition, which is 
more popular in legislative elections, treats him as only a Beijing ‘appointee’ and is 
reluctant to work with him for fear of strengthening his legitimacy31. Tsang thus faces 
partisan capture and political isolation.  
 
During his first term (May 2005- June 2007), some major policy initiatives had been 
blocked by a restless and suspicious legislature – e.g. constitutional reform, West 
Kowloon cultural project, and a goods and services tax (GST).32 He made a new start 
with his second term (from July 2007). In his 2007 re-election platform “Statement on 
Progression”, Tsang set out ten major relationships that he thought Hong Kong must 
tackle properly in order to rise to a new height and enter a new era33. The ten major 
relationships related to: development and conservation; democracy and governance; 
administration and legislature; rights and duties; rich and poor; large corporations and 
ordinary people; one country and two systems; central government and special 
administrative region; Hong Kong and the world; and progression and stagnation. The 
‘ten relationships’ remind one of Chairman Mao Zedong's famous speech on “The 
Ten Major Relationships” at the enlarged meeting of the Chinese Communist Party’s 
Central Committee Politburo in 1956. Mao’s stipulations at that time were geared 
towards resolving differences, enlarging unity, and pulling together all positive factors 
for building the new nation. By articulating his second-term vision in governance in 
such rhetoric, Tsang has in a sense identified some major dilemmas and fundamental 
cleavages in Hong Kong’s current phase of development, and the need to balance 
competing demands. If these are not properly handled, a zero-sum scenario may ensue 
whereby tensions would become hostilities. Balancing the relationships is thus about 
reducing disparities and forging mutual trust and harmony.  
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Tsang’s subsequent inaugural Policy Address of the new term was peppered with the 
‘new’-prefixes – such as new era, new spirit, new opportunities, new Hongkongers, 
new goals, new miracle and new journey34. In his 2008 policy speech, he talked about 
the importance of ‘core values’, balanced development, and the need for a ‘third way’, 
sounding more positive about government interventions when remarking that the 
market is not omnipotent and intervention is not necessarily evil35. However he has 
been unable to articulate a new discourse in governance that can excite the community 
and help rebuild a new ideological consensus. People may have liked to learn more 
about how his middle road is similar to or different from the social democrats’ ‘third 
way’ in Europe, for example. Nonetheless, for him to venture into such previously 
unthinkable territory under the past non-interventionist legacy, in which he and many 
senior officials had been brought up, is something to be acknowledged. 
 
Despite enjoying high popularity rates both at the time of his by-election in June 2005 
(72.3%) and re-election in June 2007 (68.9%), his popularity in the second term has 
been on steady decline since the middle of 2008 - to 53.8 by June 200936. 
 
Diagram 1: Support ratings for Donald Tsang as Chief Executive, 2005-09 
Source: Public Opinion Programme, University of Hong Kong (HKU POP), http://hkupop.hku.hk/ 
 
Because of his declining popularity, and the rising political criticisms of some 
government policies and positions – such as over the extension of political 
appointment system, review of old age allowance, foreign domestic helper levies, 
investigation of Lehman Brothers ‘mini-bonds’, and financial packages to face the 
new global financial crisis37 - his government has been under increasing pressure. 
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Some commentators are voicing concern whether Hong Kong is slipping into yet 
another major governance crisis that reminds people of the final years of Tung’s 
administration38. 
 
Growing partisanship and political distrust 
The SAR government’s right to govern, in the absence of popular elections, is largely 
grounded in bureaucratic merit – the same basis which underpinned the pre-1997 
administrative state. However, when Tsang tried to expand the system of political 
appointment in mid-2008 to include Undersecretaries and Political Assistants 
recruited mostly from non-civil service backgrounds, there was a serious backlash, 
with widespread public criticism about why political appointment had deviated from 
the modus operandi of the civil service system of appointment, a system which 
seemed to still enjoy greater public trust than newly emerging political institutions39.  
 
With the benefit of hindsight, he had underestimated public reaction, or more 
precisely the lack of political consensus or understanding of the new form and logic of 
political appointment. Hence once the choice of some political appointees failed to 
find acceptance, serious doubts were expressed about the integrity and transparency of 
the process, using the civil service appointment yardstick as the default benchmark. 
Tsang did not take this first crisis of his since becoming head of government lightly. 
In a somewhat historical move, he led his full ministerial team to appear before the 
Legco as it debated on a motion to demand government, under the powers and 
privileges law, to release documents on the selection of political appointees. He made 
a personal appeal to legislators to bury political disputes and work on pressing 
livelihood issues instead. While critics still faulted him for not taking direct 
responsibility for the ‘mishandling’ of the appointments, his quick and heavy dose of 
remedy underscored an assessment that this political fiasco might blow up into a 
turning point of his so-far-popular administration, just like the 2003 protest for his 
predecessor Tung Chee-hwa.  
 
Hong Kong has become more divided politically. There has been the longstanding 
conflict between the pan-democrats coalition and the pro-Beijing forces. The 
September 2008 Legislative Council election has not altered the balance of power 
between the pro-establishment and pan-democrat camps in the legislature. For half of 
the seats elected geographically by universal suffrage, given the proportional 
representation system, and the longstanding 60:40 votes share between the two camps, 
which has sustained this time, the balance of power could hardly change. The 
election, however, saw the debacle of the Liberal Party on the pro-establishment side 
and the sudden rise of the radical League of Social Democrats (LSD) on the pan-
democrat side40.  
 
The perceived wisdom that the government is under Beijing’s influence and could not 
be changed, has actually reinforced voting behaviour in favour of electing more 
critical and pro-democracy legislators to make sure government behaves. With 
functional constituencies in place to ‘protect’ the business and professional sectors, 
ordinary people become even more daring to vote in non-conformists, unionists and 
pro-grassroots politicians in geographical direct elections, in order to balance business 
power. Most commentators warn of the advent of a more difficult and pro-grassroots 
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legislature that will ignore business interests. Others feel alarmed that the Liberals’ 
setback might induce stronger resistance from the business sectors towards abolishing 
functional constituencies in Hong Kong’s already arduous path towards the goal of 
full democracy. If so, the distorted political system will continue to hamper effective 
governance.  
 
In all governments, no matter how democratic and how popular, there is always a 
mid-term crisis as people become bored by a familiar governing team that has 
outlived earlier excitement and its initial new thinking and initiatives. That is why 
most governments reshuffle from time to time. However, Tsang does not have the 
luxury of reshuffling his government team easily as all ministers are constitutionally 
appointed by the Central People’s Government upon his recommendation, and it is 
well known that Beijing prefers stability. Lacking a democratic mandate, the Tsang 
Administration has been following and responding to public opinion polls closely, 
which might cause it to change policy tracks suddenly when public opinion changes 
(such as the U-turn on the proposed means-test for old age allowance in October 2008 
and in the sending of charter planes to pick up Hong Kong residents stranded in 
Thailand in December 2008).  
 
Erosion of the administrative elite 
In addition to the pro-democracy camp versus pro-establishment confrontation, there 
have also been splits among professional elites and even within the senior civil 
service. There is not only a widening elite-mass gap, but also intra-elite divisiveness. 
At the risk of simplicity, the erosion of Hong Kong’s political system has now come 
to a stage where even the AOs are no longer the answer to the crisis of governance. 
 
Tung’s first term saw the fierce confrontation between Tung (and the takeover elites) 
and AO power (headed by former Chief Secretary Anson Chan). Tung was initially 
weakened, but the bird flu and public housing piling scandals enabled Beijing to make 
up its mind to groom a separate political class – politically appointed ministers – to 
counter and eventually take over the power from the AOs. Chan was forced to retire. 
The mass protests of 1 July 2003 changed all that. Beijing lost faith in Tung and 
planned for the return of government by AOs. Tsang, who was previously sidelined 
by Tung, was tasked by Beijing to lead the new government to replace Tung. He has 
since tried to install a reinvented form of government by AOs, as explained above.  
 
Yet some AOs do not really subscribe to the logic of political appointment which 
would open the top layers to a wide spectrum of talent from various quarters, and 
when Tsang tried to introduce Undersecretaries, there was backfire from those AOs 
whose trust in him declined. The split of AO power is also partly a result of the 
Tsang-Chan rivalry. Because of the playing up of the political appointment saga and 
the Leung Chin-man affair41 by the pro-democracy opposition and the media, the 
political discretion and integrity of Tsang’s Administration has become subject to 
growing doubts. Another drawback of the current bureaucrats-dominated government 
is its lack of a clear community power base. Given the political aloofness of the 
bureaucracy and not having to face and win a popular election, government-by-AOs 
does not have the incentives to cultivate specific supporter constituencies with 
targeted particularistic benefits and deliverables, in contrast to political parties and 
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unions which are always seeking to identify and consolidate their respective support 
base, even in a fragmented system like Hong Kong. As a result, despite its sometimes 
broad-based and generous economic relief packages and welfare handouts42, the 
government has remained ‘isolated’ by the latter; its policies and efforts have failed to 
be translated into dependable and sustainable political support. 
 
By now every potential force to form an effective government has been discredited by 
political circumstances during the political transition and after 1997 – the democrats 
(because of the lack of Beijing’s trust, and without experience and proven competence 
to govern); the pro-Beijing camp (because of the lack of local people’s political trust 
in them, and also without experience and proven competence to govern); the business 
elites (because of the poor performance of Tung, lack of touch with ordinary people, 
and public resent of ‘government-business collusion’); and now the bureaucrats 
represented by the AOs (because they are no longer ‘gods’ after the Leung Chin-man 
affair). 
 
HONG KONG IN THE FUTILE SEARCH FOR POLITICAL TRUST AND 
LEGITIMACY 
Deficit in trust despite government performance 
In Asia, other developed economies like Japan, South Korea and Taiwan are facing 
even higher level of dissatisfaction and distrust in political institutions. Both Taiwan’s 
president Ma Ying-jeou and Korean president Lee Myung-bak had obtained over 70% 
of the popular vote when elected, but their popularity rating soon became far lower 
than that of Hong Kong’s chief executive43. Even though the local media have been 
painting a negative picture of government performance and the competence of 
officials, Hong Kong has been doing very well internationally, despite the lack of 
democracy. The World Bank’s 2008 governance indicators show that the SAR stands 
at the top of the list in terms of political stability (86.1 out of 100), government 
effectiveness (95.3), regulatory quality (100), rule of law (90.9) and control of 
corruption (94.2). Its only drawback is in ‘voice and accountability’, but with a score 
of 60.6 (much higher than Singapore’s 35.1) it is still on a par with the new Asian 
democracies like South Korea (at 65.4) and Taiwan (at 68.8)44. 
 
Such international performance does not help the government ride over domestic 
political quagmire as Hong Kong heads towards an increasingly fragmented polity. 
The political game is fast becoming a zero-sum one, in which it is difficult for any 
government to govern because parties, business interests and civil society groups will 
not make its life easy. Executive-legislative tension continues. The political AOs find 
it increasingly difficult to exercise authority and assert policy leadership, with 
political appointees unable to gain (or regain) political trust given the damage suffered 
in 2008. The window of political opportunity for policymaking is narrowing. People 
become all the more cynical. Meanwhile, the lack of democratic progress since 1997 
(within the non-democratic national system of the People’s Republic of China) has 
also induced a form of ‘democracy by substitutes’ – namely in the form of ‘voice’ 
(such as protests, media monitoring, commentaries) and the politics of opinion polls. 
The role of legislators and political parties has degenerated into a collective 
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‘opposition’ which only serves to question government intentions and add to the crisis 
of political trust and legitimacy. Yet, even though the public values the watchdog 
function of the legislature, legislators’ popularity ratings have ironically continued to 
decline vis-a-vis a government without popular mandate45. In a sense Hong Kong is 
trapped in a political system with no winners. 
 
Back in the colonial era of the 1970s, a reformist governor, Murray MacLehose, could 
bulldoze major institutional reforms short of democracy – such as the setting up of the 
Independent Commission Against Corruption to clean up government, and the launch 
of ambitious public housing, education and medical care programmes – in order to 
achieve some form of legitimacy based on instrumental trust. He had almost 
autocratic powers to make policy, did not have to face an institutionalized opposition 
or a vibrant civil society, and could focus on overcoming bureaucratic inertia.  
However, such form of enlightened colonial authoritarianism cannot be replicated in 
the SAR era. Nowadays, partial democracy has created a vocal legislature, yet the 
lack of full democracy has not made available to the government a clear mandate to 
make major policy initiatives. It simply cannot dictate its will (or even reforms) on 
society, unlike the colonial reformist administration, but has to work much harder to 
achieve social consensus and political support. When parties and legislators join 
hands to oppose government proposals, without the backing by clear public support, 
the government would have no alternative but to back down. The re-planning of the 
West Kowloon Cultural District and the shelving of the goods and services tax 
proposal are cases in point.  
 
Democratic governance is generally regarded as conducive to building political trust, 
and to giving government the legitimacy to rule. It is at the same time a positive 
institutionalization of distrust as embodied in the principle of the separation of power, 
and in various institutions of accountability, audit and scrutiny. If the people are over-
confident in their rulers, it may lead to government arrogance or even 
authoritarianism. Hence democracy requires a right balance between trust and distrust 
in order to function in practice. In Hong Kong, though, the fundamental constitutional 
flaws have by nature put the government in permanent legitimacy deficit and 
uncertainty. As the political quagmire resulting from the unresolved constitutional 
debate drags on, the lack of trust by the community at large in a government they feel 
they have no part to elect persists. The social capital so necessary for policy capacity 
will be hard to come by. While trust has yet to be fully nurtured, the level of distrust 
continues to rise, which creates such a gap that may ultimately be too large to be filled 
by the practice of governance and politics. As Hardin said, “government need not be 
legitimated in Locke’s sense to survive and even to manage a nation through major 
difficulties and into prosperity. It may suffice that government not be generally 
distrusted”46. The challenge to the SAR government is how to overcome the 
accumulation of distrust in society, and distrust comes easily. 
 
Understanding Hong Kong’s crisis of trust 
There are essentially two different sources of ‘trust’ – instrumental/functional and 
integrative/value-oriented, which I would denote here as Type A and Type B Trust for 
easy reference. These can be identified as follows: 
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Table 3: Different sources of Trust 
 
Instrumental/Functional  
(Type A Trust) 
Integrative/Value-oriented 
(Type B Trust) 
Performance trust 
• Based on government performance or 
satisfaction with government 
performance47  
Strategic trust 
• To exchange citizens’ trust with 
performance of public officials and their 
institutions48 
Paternalistic trust 
• Trust in moral obligation of those in 
power to care for and protect those less 
powerful and are in need of help49 
• Accepting the authorities’ power in 
confidence that it will be used to fulfill 
the caring responsibility and not do harm 
or hurt the interest of the people50 
Moralistic trust 
• Based on normative values of trust and 
on culture and disposition as the 
foundations of trust, e.g. a sense of 
shared humanity, or altruistic concern 
for the community 51  
• Trust as a ‘moral good’, so that social 
cooperation is made possible52 
Symbolic trust 
• Trust in those values as represented by 
institutions, to create solidarity and 
integration53  
 
Without delving into a full discussion on the various dimensions and foundations of 
trust (or distrust), it would suffice to say in the present discussion that the crisis of 
trust suffered by the SAR government can be better understood within a multi-
dimensional context than just as a matter of democratic deficit. The following 
framework (Diagram 2) seeks to identify various elements of trust and distrust 
relevant to analyzing the situation. It can be argued that the changing political context 
and rising public expectations after 1997 have affected the level of Type A trust even 
though there has been the same degree of performance as in the former colonial days. 
Type B trust is probably what the SAR government is most deficient in, partly due to 
the democratic deficit, and partly because of the lack of a sense of common identity 
and shared values which are essential to underpin institutions in order for trust to 
build. Type A trust can reinforce Type B trust, but only to an extent. On the other 
hand, Type B trust is now most crucial in helping to generate performance capacity 
which can in turn enhance government performance, thereby strengthening Type A 
trust as well. Whereas Type A might well be the main basis of trust for the pre-1997 
administration, the post-1997 SAR government has to increasingly rely on and 
cultivate Type B trust to sustain public trust in its authority and public institutions. 
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Go v e r n m e n t  
P e r f o r m a n c e
Go v e r n m e n t  
P e r f o r m a n c e  Ca p a c i t y
Key Basis of Trust 
pre-1997 ?
Rising Basis of Trust/Distrust 
post-1997 ?
I n s t r u m e n t a l /
Fu n c t i o n a l
Tr u s t  /  D i s t r u s t  
(Tr u s t  A )
•Performance outcome 
meet citizens’ 
expectations?
I n t e g r a t i v e  /  
V a l u e -o r i e n t e d
Tr u s t  /  D i s t r u s t
(Tr u s t  B )
•Common Identity? 
•Shared Values?
•Institutional symbolism?
Good performance generates/
reinforces trust
More trust (A)  
facilitates performance 
capacity
Enhance        performance?
More trust (B) 
generates 
performance 
capacity?
Actual performance as confirmation of 
values (Is there a fit?)
Reinforcement ?
Strong governance is difficult to pursue in any habitat of widespread distrust. Policy 
problems and solutions have a world of their own which needs to be dealt with in a 
rational and evidence-based manner, but political reductionism can easily simplify 
policy debates into the talk of an original sin about the lack of democracy and people 
power, a theme too many would be tempted to harp on in order to avoid facing hard 
policy realities. Institutional reforms and policy changes become easily derailed 
because the SAR government lacks legitimacy. Government-by-AOs, though known 
for administrative expertise, does not display the values-driven moral force that is so 
essential to governing in crisis. Distrust – whether from legislators or ordinary citizens 
– breeds greater pressure on accountability on a day-to-day basis as people become 
increasingly suspicious and skeptical of government intentions. Such distrust is being 
reciprocated by government officials growing weary and skeptical of critics and 
dissenting voices. Ministers feel inhibited from being too innovative or 
unconventional in policy thinking. Civil servants become more uptight about being 
flexible in the application of policies and the exercise of discretionary power, when 
they suspect public and legislative reaction is unlikely to be sympathetic if anything 
goes wrong or controversial. In the end, the overall government capacity to make hard 
policy choices becomes minimized.  
 
Distrust also breeds the blaming game between government and parties/legislators, as 
well as between officials and civil society groups. It is a great weapon to derail 
unpopular policies and measures, whereas policy innovation (particularly where short-
term pain is involved) can only be facilitated if there is an adequate level of trust in 
government, otherwise skepticism prevails and public policy comes to a standstill. As 
The Economist commented about the ‘blame syndrome’ in the UK after the outbreak 
of the global financial crisis, 
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“But an excess of blame – blind and unthinking as it often seems – can be as dangerous 
as a deficit of it. Vitriolic blame can wreck morale in institutions …. It can inhibit 
decision-making and worthwhile risk-taking. And it can be both intellectually lazy and 
delusional. The wrong kind of blame reflects a false, dangerous simplification – and a 
false, childish hope”.54 
 
Inasmuch as the lack of performance breeds distrust, and vice versa, it would be 
equally right to say that incessant distrust will ultimately hamper performance because 
the necessary capacity to take risk and make innovate changes in order to face up to 
rising challenges is absent. How to rebuild trust and reduce distrust in the current 
period of political quagmire, to link up the political and policy worlds, is the most 
daunting task facing Hong Kong. 
 
Professor Anthony Cheung, Ph.D., President and Chair Professor of Public 
Administration, The Hong Kong Institute of Education: ablcheung@ied.edu.hk 
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